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1. Causality and Explanation 
 Not all explanations are causal.  Often children and adults explain phenomena by 
categorizing, as for example when one categorizes a species of being of a genus.  So a 
child may ask why does the chicken fly, and be quite informatively happy when told, 
“It’s a bird.”  No doubt there are many other explanatory forms.  Peter Achinstein called 
the categorization kind of explanation above a ‘classification explanation’.   He also 
discussed other kinds of explanations including special-case-of-a-law, identity, and 
derivation explanations. (Achinstein, 1983, Chapters 7 and 8). I will not talk about these. 
However, most of his time was spent on causal and functional causal explanations. I take 
functional explanations to be a type of causal explanation, and both of these I take to be 
best exemplified by explanations that describe mechanisms for how something comes 
about or is produced.  I take this to be the most common type of explanations used in 
science. 
 In order to discuss causal explanations, in particular those causal explanations that 
are provided by mechanisms, we need to do a little ground clearing about causality. Ned 
Hall (2004) distinguishes two concepts of causation:  dependence and production. So 
maybe not all causal explanations are productive. A version of the productive theory was 
the classical theory, where the major maxim until the 18th Century was: the effect is 
                                                 
11 This paper owes much to many discussions with and helpful comments from Jim 
Bogen.   Jim Woodward and Michael Strevens also helped me clarify points, when a 
version was presented in symposium with them at the University of Calgary. The Fellows 
visiting the Center for Philosophy of Science, Spring 2007, (Fritz Allhoff, Johannes 
Persson, Demetris Portides and Brad Wilson) and the Center’s Director John Norton all 
helped shape this paper when they discussed it with me at one of their weekly meetings. 
Megan Delehanty (now a professor at Calgary) originally gave me a copy of the term 
paper from which I quote, back in 2001 when she wrote it for a seminar.  She most 
graciously agreed to let me reproduce her diagram and use her example. I also learned 
much from Sandra Mitchell by listening to her lecture and then reading a draft of her 
book. 
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contained in the cause. Containment was their way of talking about the productive 
connection between cause and effect, often in terms of an active principle connected to 
the cause which brought about the effect.  We don’t talk like that now.  Yet, maybe we 
should talk about causally productive activities, especially if dependence is not really a 
way of indicating causal continuity but only a way we talk about causes.  
 David Hume asked what is the necessary connection between cause and effect?  
He says that it’s a fact that we cannot see the necessary connection. (Strangely, Carl 
Craver and William Bechtel (2007) take Hume to be making the claim that the cause and 
the effect must be logically independent. If this just means there is no necessary 
connection, then it adds nothing to the no-necessity claim.  If it means something more, 
like there are no ‘logical’ relations among the entities that stand in a cause effect relation, 
either I do not understand it because I don’t know what logical relations are between 
entities or it’s false because we can always find numerous relations among entities 
satisfying most any criteria.)  But Hume was right, we cannot see the necessity, though I 
distrust facts about what cannot be seen. So he’s right, though not in the way he thinks.  
We cannot see the necessary connection, because there are no necessary connections in 
nature. So it might seem we should be dependence theorists.  But this would be to argue 
that the way we sometimes think and talk is really the way things are, to confuse the ontic 
with the epistemological. Jim Woodward’s  (2005) idea that causality makes a difference 
to what happens can be read either epistemically or ontically.  He uses it epistemically 
when he talks about intervention as the way to find out about causes, and tries for an 
ontic claim when he invokes counterfactuals.  I would cash out “make a difference’ is 
terms of causal productivity. 
 In terms of ontology, I believe everyone today agrees that nature is contingent 
(though, for example, Hobbes and Spinoza did not). The world didn’t have to be the way 
it is. Yet it does not follow that all is accidental or merely correlated.  “Accidental” does 
not mean the same as “contingent”.  Some contingent connections are causal. Others are 
not.  Once one gets rid of this idea that in the world there exists some sort of necessity for 
the causal, the major metaphysical impetus for thinking about causality in terms of 
counterfactuals disappears.  Hypothetical conditionals, subjunctives, and future 
conditionals will do all the work we need for planning, intervening, discovering, and 
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testing. And we can and do make contingent means-ends claims about hypothetical 
necessities. But this is not, nor do we need to have, a metaphysical theory about necessity 
based on counterfactuals and/or possible worlds. We do make general metaphysical 
claims when we speak of entities engaging in productive activities.  Yet such a way of 
talking does not constitute a theory. Maybe it could, but who would be interested?  
 In the rational world of persons (the space of reasons), there may be good reasons 
to speak some times of ‘necessary’ connections such as truth preserving inferences in 
logic.  Maybe these are necessary, where “necessity” means something like “on pain of 
contradiction”.   (But is contradiction really such a pain?  Who wants a foolish 
consistency any way? John Wisdom once said that if all you can do with a philosophical 
argument is twit your opponent with inconsistency, this is not very interesting.)  But let’s 
ignore the complications of reason for the moment.  
 Connections in the natural world come in many varieties.  We have plethora of 
verbs to describe them. Mere correlation, however, is not a connection.  It presupposes a 
strong independence between the ‘things’ correlated.  It is only an association between 
two or more ‘things’, a pairing. It may be accidental, meaning that we understand no 
reason for the connection, or that there is no causal relation among the ‘things’. If one is a 
strict associationist in philosophy or psychology, then this is all we can have.  But even 
Hume saw that such pairings don’t lead us to act as if this all we have.  Maybe there is 
good reason why we don’t.  
 Another constraint on connections is that we would like them to be relatively 
regular, or at least be possibly repeatable in something like the same ways. It may be that 
a mechanism or causal connection, in fact, works only once. Think of Rube Goldberg 
machine that self-destructs. But if it was a causal connection, and not accidental or a 
mere correlation, we would be willing to bet it could happen again. Sandra Mitchell 
(2008) has described this criterion of connection in terms of stability. Cf. Woodward and 
Craver on invariance, perhaps Wimsatt robustness. 
 Causal connections may not be necessary, but they do exhibit a continuity that 
provides the basis for why we find them to be intelligible.  By discovering the kinds of 
connections, we can give the reasons why they are ordered in connected ways. In science, 
acceptable causal relations are those that our scientific investigations reveal to us as how 
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the world works.  We have to discover them.  However, what are taken as acceptable 
connections, what we think we have learned, changes over time.  Acceptable bases, what 
are called “bottom out” fundamentals (MDC 2000), are historically domain or discipline 
dependent. Yet again, let me caution that “bottom out” while suggesting down, need not 
be a reductive strategy.  The bottom out fundamentals at a time need not be ‘lower level’ 
mechanisms. 
 Many years back, Norwood Russell Hanson (1958) wrote:  “The primary reason 
for referring to a cause of x is to explain x.  There are as many causes of x as there are 
explanations of x. …We have had an explanation of x only when we set it into an 
interlocking pattern of concepts about other things, y and z. …what we refer to as 
‘causes’ are theory laden from beginning to end.  These are not simple tangible links in 
the chain of sense experience, but rather details in an intricate pattern of concepts.” 
(Hanson 1958, p. 54). His example is seeing a stab wound, and knowing what kind of 
thing must be its cause and the general background conditions in which describing a 
phenomenon as a “stab wound” makes sense. Later, he adds: “The background 
information, the ‘set’ that makes an explanation stand out, derives as much from what is 
obvious in the situation as from discursive knowledge gained through training” (p. 62).  
Hanson is a causal pluralist (Cf. Mitchell 2009 & 2003). Earlier, Stephen Toulmin  
(1953) had made a similar Wittgensteinian point, when he described an explanation as 
being like a map.  More recently, Michael Strevens (2007) acknowledged some of these 
connections when he wrote:  “Because the mechanical information is subject to constraint 
from below, the search for a mechanism is guided in part by wider beliefs about the 
workings of the appropriate basic level.”  
 Background information, wider beliefs, and such ways of talking point to the fact 
that we explain phenomena using terms that connect what is to be explained with other 
things that we take to be more basic, fundamental, and which we think we know. Note 
that “more basic” or “fundamental” need not be taken in any ‘reductive’ sense. It maybe 
that what is fundamental to being a person is to make inferences in such a way that one is 
responsible for their conclusions or the actions that follow from them.  We would then 
have to explain this inference making ability and responsibility ascription, at least in part, 
by tying these activities to social parameters and conditions.   
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 This tying together of what we already know or take as knowledge sounds much 
like the old familiarity thesis.  We explain phenomena in terms of what is familiar.  Or, 
phenomena are explained when they are ‘reduced’ to the familiar.  Carl Hempel and Paul 
Oppenheim (1948) argued against one version of this thesis, viz. that the explanation had 
to produce some feeling a familiarity in the person who understood the explanation. 
(Aspects, p. 257).  But the Wittgensteinian and Salmonian move to inclusion in an 
(ordered) set of concepts and how these refer to acceptable causal relations among the 
things of the world does not depend on psychological feeling, so this form of the 
objection does not touch our ontic version of familiarity as background knowledge. 
 In explanations we do explain by showing how the phenomenon came about in 
terms of what we already accept about how things work. (This sounds almost like 
Mackie’s ‘laws of working’ (1980), but seldom are they what we describe as laws).  So in 
this sense scientists do explain things in terms of what is familiar to them, by training 
(which depends on field or discipline). They learn causal exemplars.  Schaffner (in 
correspondence) called them ‘accepted causal prototypes’. There is of course, one 
notable, most important exception; when one discovers a novel explanation by 
discovering a new mechanism or mechanical process and changes what a discipline 
believes.  In such a case the reformer introduces new, unfamiliar causes to provide the 
explanation. But even here, the novel explainers must conform to many other things we 
know about how things work, what causes what, etc.   Presumably this is what Watson 
and Crick did when they described DNA as a double helix that unwound to produce RNA 
(and eventually proteins). 
 I have already shifted from causes to explanations.  So let us continue.  Here are 
three claims I wish to defend, given the restriction above to a limited kind of explanation 
(i.e. to causal, functional explanations): 
1. Explanations should provide causes (or reasons). 
2. Explanations should make phenomena intelligible. 
3. Explanations should exhibit the continuity among the explaining parts.  
 
I shall elaborate each of these claims as follows: 
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1’. Explanations provide causes by providing mechanisms.  Knowledge of mechanisms 
provides us the with the reasons we use in explanations (and in the self referential case of 
inference, there is a mechanism by which reasoned inference works, albeit a social-
cognitive mechanism.) 
 
2’.  Intelligibility (or understanding, if you prefer) is brought about when one sees how 
the phenomenon is produced according to a familiar, acceptable set of more basic beliefs, 
or how a mechanism, and entities and activities that comprise them, produces the 
phenomenon of interest in accord with some more basic beliefs.  (Note these basic beliefs 
need not be at a ‘lower’ level.  Sometimes we explain why a phenomenon is produced by 
appeal to larger systems within which that mechanism functions.) Most if not all 
explanations are multi-level. For many, if not most cases, there are multiple explanations 
that are not alternatives to each other. So, it is not the case that there must be only one 
acceptable explanation for any phenomenon. 
 
3’. Intelligibility depends crucially on comprehending the continuity among the entities 
and activities that comprise the mechanism that is the explanation.  This continuity is not 
the unifying of domains spoken of by Michael Friedman and Philip Kitcher.  It is the 
continuity or sense that is inherent in the already accepted relations among entities and 
their activities that make for a coherent narrative. This why they may be used as part of a 
mechanism to explain a stage in the process about how a mechanism produces a 
phenomenon. I am also ignoring here a difficult point, discussed at length by Achinstein 
(1983), about who can make what intelligible to whom, i.e., the pragmatics of someone 
giving explanations to someone else.  In fact, this is a topic for experimental philosophy. 
 
Let us still briefly look at each of these claims in turn. 
 
2. Mechanisms: 
Over 40 years ago, Peter Alexander (1963), though he did not use the word “mechanism” 
wrote: “What is needed for an explanation of the observed movements [of a toy engine] 
is an account of something other than these movements together with the exhibiting of a 
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certain kind of connection between this something other and those movements.  The sort 
of connection required is roughly indicated by saying that what is needed is an account of 
whatever makes the movements in question occur or of something of which these 
movements are a consequence.”  (Alexander, 1963, p. 117).  He goes on to say that we 
need to see how the explaining features are relevant to what is being explained   Further, 
“it is also seeing that the arrangement of the parts is such that when the wheels revolve 
the head must move in the way it does, in some sense of must; it is seeing how the 
movement is a consequence of the arrangement of parts. “ (Alexander, 1963, 118).  
Alexander is still hung up on the necessity, and so the emphasis is on the must.  But it 
seems quite clear he is describing a mechanism. He also says “It [the explanation of the 
toy engine] would be acceptable to most people because it is in terms of pulls and 
pushes.” (Alexander 1963, 116). 
 A short time later, Rom Harré (1970) “In order to give a scientific explanation 
every happening must be looked upon as due to the workings of some mechanism, which 
may be proceeding in isolation from its environment…or may be in various degrees 
dependent for stimulation in the circumnambient conditions…” (Harré 1970, p. 124)  
Earlier he (Harré 1961) had entitled a chapter of his book Theories and Things, “From 
Models to Mechanisms”.   So there is an interesting history of tying mechanism to 
explanation. 
 In Machamer, Darden and Craver (2000), we cited William Wimsatt, Kenneth 
Schaffner, William Bechtel and Robert Richardson, and Stuart Glennan as persons who 
had explored the concept of mechanism.  Wesley Salmon and Phil Dowe also have 
mechanistic theories. More recently Michael Strevens is defending an account of 
mechanism explanations (Strevens 2008). MDC defined a mechanism as follows: 
“Mechanisms are entities and activities organized such that they are productive of regular 
changes from start or set-up to finish or termination conditions.” (MDC 2000).  One 
problem with this definition is the inclusion of the word “regular”.  Some mechanisms 
are not regular, and indeed, there may be mechanisms that work only once.  There also 
may be more than one mechanism for producing the same effect. 
 William Bechtel and Adele Abrahamsen (2005) give brief definition:  
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 A mechanism is a structure performing a function in virtue of its component parts, 
component operations, and their organization.   The orchestrated functioning of 
the mechanism is responsible for one or more phenomena. (2006, p.3) 
I guess here “responsible” and “functioning” are the causal surrogates.  Further, 
mechanisms are not just structures, they act and do things. 
Recently Jim Bogen and I wrote: 
 A mechanism is a collection of entities that act in certain causally specific ways.  
When a mechanism operates successfully, the entities in the collection engage in a 
temporally ordered sequence of activities by which the mechanism moves from an 
initial to a final state constituted by the production of one or more effects or end 
states. The entities in the system are ordered spatially, temporally, and 
functionally as required for the productive continuity of the activities that bring 
about the end state. 
 
Explanations provide information that shows why or how an event or state of affairs 
came to be2. The operation of a mechanism is how or why a state of affairs came to be. 
The information an explanation provides by describing a mechanism is information for 
use in inferences about how the mechanism will continue, how it reaches it’s end state, 
and how certain stages by virtue of their activities relate to earlier or later stages.  In this 
way mechanisms provide information about what does, could or would happen if the 
mechanisms is not interfered with or undermined in some way.  Such interference (or 
interventions) are often the best way to find out what are the parts of the mechanism and 
what is causing what to happen in it.) 
 Sometimes mechanisms are used to explain by showing how they function in 
‘larger’ systems.  Evolutionary explanations of specific mechanisms for the emotion of 
fear of snakes in terms of natural selection are one example (see Roach, 2001). So is 
explaining why a person’s action, e.g. stopping at traffic lights, is seen as acceptable in 
terms of social (in the example case legal) norms. 
 
                                                 
2 This is an inferential sense of information, which will be described in more detail 
below. 
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3.  Intelligibility 
Strevens (2007) touches on the intelligibility question when he speaks about “the 
constraint from below”.  He says any mechanism must be implemented at some 
appropriate basic level, and what are appropriate levels are field dependent, not 
metaphysically fundamental and not known apodictically (i.e., they can change.)  
In MDC (2000) we wrote:  
Nested hierarchical descriptions of mechanisms typically bottom out in lowest 
level mechanisms. These are the components that are accepted as relatively 
fundamental or taken to be unproblematic for the purposes of a given scientist, 
research group, or field. Bottoming out is relative: Different types of entities and 
activities are where a given field stops when constructing mechanisms. The 
explanation comes to an end, and description of lower level mechanisms would be 
irrelevant to their interests. Also, scientific training is often concentrated at or 
around certain levels of mechanisms. Neurobiologists with different theoretical or 
experimental interests bottom out in different types of entities and activities. 
Some neurobiologists are primarily interested in behaviors of organisms, some are 
primarily interested in the activities of molecules composing nerves cells, and 
others devote their attention to phenomena in between. The fields of molecular 
biology and neurobiology… do not typically regress to the quantum level to talk 
about the activities of, e.g., chemical bonding.  … But remember, what is 
considered the bottom out level may change.  
 
These bottom out activities in molecular biology and neurobiology can be 
categorized into four types:  
(i) geometrico-mechanical; 
(ii) electro-chemical; 
(iii) energetic; 
 (iv) electro-magnetic.” 
The adequacy of the taxonomy of these 4 types of activities has not been explored.  But 
they are the types, or at least some of them, that characterize mechanisms, and their 
workings and which are taken as being intelligible. Carla Fehr (2005) argues that “The 
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explanatory power of a mechanism is dependent upon its epistemological context and the 
contexts of these mechanisms differ.” She wants to ‘unpack’ epistemological context in 
terms of Helen Longino’s local epistemologies. Certainly what is accepted is relative to a 
group, and maybe fields and disciplines are too large in many cases, especially fields that 
break into subfields or disciplines engage in controversies. 
 When a scientist in neurobiology talks about an action potential’s arriving thereby 
raising the membrane voltage sufficiently for opening an calcium specific ion channel, 
this is taken to be an accepted mechanical description.  It was not always so. Carl Craver 
describes how in 1969, Bertil Hille who was working out the mechanism for Hodgkin 
and Huxley on action potentials was chastised by Kenneth Cole for pushing the idea of 
channels too far.   (Craver 2007, chapter 2). 
 This intelligibility is somehow transitive in explanatory contexts.  The lower 
levels, described as stages in a mechanism, do not merely constrain what happens, they 
are the explanation of how what happens happens.  That they must be able to be 
implemented in known or conjectured physical entities and activities serves as a 
constraint on providing an explanation by a mechanism.  And often a scientist comes up 
with a possible mechanism, before finding one (that one or a different one) that is 
plausible or actual.  It needs also to be noted that each of these explanations by 
mechanisms is multi-level and so not reductive in any sense. Further, it should be 
understood that mechanisms may be identified and explained by ‘higher’ levels and need 
not always be given in terms of decomposed, constitutive parts. An information 
processing mechanism is one such case because the information is for use by some 
system that contains that mechanism. 
 Yet there are other important kinds of constraint.   I shall only explore one. Carl 
Craver wrote in recent draft of a paper, "The boundaries of what counts as a mechanism 
(what is inside and what is outside) are fixed by reference to the phenomenon to be 
explained" (Craver 2007, and he cites Bechtel and Richardson 1993 and Glennan 1996, 
and see Bechtel 2008.)  But "fixed" is most often too strong.  There are many ways to 
skin a cat; and, the same protein may be made in so many different ways that it often 
becomes impossible to form a generalization (or law) that there is a single 'gene' 
responsible, or that the mechanism used in a particular case is always the mechanism for 
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making that protein.  (Griffiths and Stotz, http://www.representinggenes.org/, and more 
generally for pluralism, Mitchell 2003). In most any case in neuroscience, the termination 
conditions allow for many alternative paths that would bring them into being. Carl 
Hempel (1965) recognized this when talking about functional explanations when he 
noted that they lack necessity because of alternative mechanisms for achieving the same 
end.)  So for example, pleasure may be obtained in numerous ways, resulting from many 
different mechanisms. But looked at from the start up conditions forward, we are seeking 
a causal specificity that exhibits why this path was the one in this case that brought about 
the end state  (Cf. Woodward 2007). 
 An example will help specify these claims, and further allow us to bring out some 
different points. A classic textbook on The Central Nervous System (Brodal 2004) 
explains part of the olfaction system as follows: 
Experiments with a large number of ordorants suggest that the shape of the 
molecule, rather than its chemical composition, determines how it smells 
(stereospecificity).  The stereochemcial theory of smell proposes that the 
receptor sites on receptor cells have different shapes and that only 
molecules with a complementary shape fit into that receptor site.  Binding 
of an ordorant to receptors in the membrane of the cilia evokes a receptor 
potential.  This involves activation of G proteins and cyclic AMP.  
Increased intracellular cyclic AMP opens Na+-selective cation channels 
and thus depolarizes the cell, corresponding to the situation in 
photoreceptors.  In contrast to photoreceptors, however, the olfactory 
receptors produce action potentials.  The action potential arises in the 
initial segment of the axon and is transmitted to the olfactory bulb. (p. 
234) 
 
Here there is described a mechanism (albeit probable) that explains how an odorant (or 
some kind of molecule that produces a particular smell) binds to a receptor site and 
evokes an action potential which explains the end state, here the arrival of the smell 
signal in the olfactory bulb. The explanation proceeds by breaking down the olfactory 
system into composing entities (molecules, receptor sites, cyclic AMP, olfactory bulb, 
etc.), their properties (shape) and their activities (binding depolarization producing). (For 
typical decomposition strategies see William Bechtel and Robert Richardson 1993.) This 
part of the olfaction system is identified by describing how the mechanism works in order 
to send the smell signal into the olfactory bulb.  Needless to say the explanation in the 
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text does not stop here.   It goes on to describe how the efferent fibers from olfactory bulb 
end at the medial aspect of the temporal lobe—partly in the cortex and partly in the 
amygdala.  Also of interest is that mechanism as described, in its startup condition, as 
beginning with an odorant.  Obviously there is more that might be said about how odors 
enter the nose, get dissolved in the mucous, and become separated into different 
molecules.  
 This demonstrates that what counts as a mechanism depends on the end state 
chosen.  Where the explainer decides to stop.  This is a partial function of the purposes or 
interests of the investigator.  We might call such ending points, perspectival ends. In a 
typical case, the investigator identifies the system in terms of its end state, which is the 
end selected because it is relevant to her research. The system and its mechanism is 
simplified, idealized, and considered to be isolated or closed, and independent of other 
systems. But this perspectival end state is only one aspect of exploring mechanisms.  
More significant constraints come from what is discovered about the world. The 
anatomical and physiological studies provide knowledge about the world that constrain 
where the investigator looks, what she studies and tries to isolate and identify, what can 
be discovered, and, most importantly, what end states may be chosen to be investigated. 
These are objective constraints even given the scientists’ choices.  These objective 
constraints may be studied by trying to ascertain the causal specificity among the parts 
and activities being studied (Woodward 2007). I‘ll call these natural ends.  These 
perspectival and natural ends contrast with a stronger more robust notion of teleology that 
is at work in some mechanisms, particularly those that are said to carry information.   But 
more about information later. 
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adapted from Megan Delehanty, mss.  
Here’s a diagrammatic example (which I have taken from a term paper written in 
2001 by Megan Delehanty).  If the scientist is interested only whether or how X is 
produced, then that fact that X may be produced in any of three ways, or in 
combination, from D, C or E pathways does not tell us more than X is produced 
and that it came about in any one of the three ways.  We do not need to know 
which of the pathways was active.  However if we look farther and are interested 
now only in X, but also in its relationship to Z, then it matters that X was 
produced by the activity of the B-D pathway.  Here what is identified as the 
relevant mechanism clearly depends upon what our interest is.  Delehanty actually 
provides a real case that fits this schema, that of ras genes in Dictyostelium.  She 
writes  
 “There are five ras genes in this organism, expressed at different but 
overlapping times in development.  RasB, rasC, and rasS are all expressed 
during the amoeboid phase as well as during aggregation and are 
redundant in regard to their function in aggregation.  If we take 
aggregation as our end point, it is not essential to an explanation of why 
aggregation proceeded normally to know whether rasB, rasC, or rasS was 
active (whether, say one had been knocked out.)  If we are interested in 
aggregation not only as a phenomenon which is independently interesting, 
but as one of set of activities requiring regulation of the cytoskeleton…we 
might care that rasB has effects on the cytoskeleton which are not shared 
by rasC or rasS and which do not affect aggregation but do cause defects 
in cytokinesis (Z).” (Delehanty, mss. 2001; quoted with permission.) 
 Mechanistic descriptions such as the olfactory system or Dictyostelium are a 
prelude to working out procedures for the discovery of mechanisms.  (Lindley Darden 
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and Carl Craver have worked on this problem, Craver 2001 & 2002; Darden 2007.) 
Notice though that the end conditions, evoking an action potential that travels to the 
olfactory bulb or aggregation and defects in cytokinesis, are taken to be unproblematic 
natural end points.  In the smell case it is natural because we have long believed we know 
many of the parts and activities of the mechanism, and we are just trying to establish 
more clearly how it works. In aggregation we have come to know that this is an important 
part of what the organism does.  Yet, there is no incompatibility in these cases between 
being natural end point and being socially or personally chosen.  These ends are both 
perspectival and natural. The researcher identifies the perspectival end stage of the 
mechanism (or system), although it is a naturally occurring outcome of a production in 
nature. It a natural state treated as an end. (Marcel Weber (in correspondence) noted this 
dual aspect.)  The researcher also has to make many decisions as to what to include in the 
mechanism that produces the end state, and these decisions too are constrained by what's 
there, what's happening, and what techniques she has available for investigation.  One 
way to think about the need for such choices in naturalistic contexts is that there are no 
closed systems in nature, and so the researcher must put limits on them (close them) for 
explanatory and investigatory purposes.  This echoes the rationale given for controlled 
experiments.  
 There are some limits usually provided by the physiological constraints of what 
we believe we know about the system under study—our background knowledge or 
beliefs. More philosophically, we generally do not countenance mechanism explanations 
for 'non natural,' Cambridge complex properties (e.g., the object or event formed my 
mixing a martini today at 4 p.m. and Jim’s fear of his visit to dentist tomorrow.) We do 
not think we could ever find any productive connection among these activities.  We have 
no useable criteria or background knowledge that places these events into a unified 
system. Our presumed knowledge at a time is used to specify what counts as a system as 
well as what is included in that system to be studied. If we wish to study some emotional 
mechanism, our knowledge (borne, as Tom Kuhn said, from our training) of what 
constitutes the emotion systems puts boundaries on where and what kinds of 
mechanisms, entities and activities we may look for. This was the point of incorporation 
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into a system of concepts that Toulmin and Hanson were theorizing. Yet, at times we 
may decide to question that ‘accepted’ knowledge. 
 What count as proper phenomena for explanations by mechanisms depend, most 
usually, on the criteria of importance that are in place in the discipline at a time.  This 
means there is always an evaluative component operative in selection of end states to be 
explained. Yet, there are physical systems with equilibrium states, where being in 
equilibrium or in homeostasis is the natural end, and we seek to discover the mechanism 
by which such equilibrium is achieved.  Here we might be tempted to say that this is a 
natural end system, where the importance of the end is given by nature, and we just 
become interested in it.  But if somehow we established there were no true equilibrium 
systems in nature, or that the single phenomenon we are investigating is really myriad of 
different systems operating in different ways, then it is we who would have made the 
mistake in identifying the phenomenon of our research and treating it as real, though 
describing such a state for comparison’s sake could still prove useful.  This is the 
problem of external or ecological validity. 
 
4. Explanation and Continuity 
 The continuity I am concerned with lies in the intelligible connections that unify 
or connect the stages of mechanisms.  Intelligible connections as well as acceptable 
entities, as we saw above, are assumed as acceptable, and so constitute the tool box, the 
explanatory text, that may be used in a domain (or field) at a time. Maybe it would be 
helpful to describe this in terms of the explanatory narratives that define a field? 
Sometimes intelligible connections (mechanisms, mechanism schema, or mechanism 
stages) in one domain are extended by analogy or model extension to another, new 
domain; and this may unite two domains to be explained into one, so this would be how 
we could attach the continuity I speak of with the unity of Michael Friedman and Philip 
Kitcher. 
 Causal connections or activities provide the continuity among entities (or stages) 
that are constitutive of the mechanism.  This continuity, perhaps, is what people sought 
when they were looking for the Hume’s “necessary connection”. The continuity shows us 
why what happens brings about the goal state of interest. This in turn is the reason why 
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the mechanism makes a difference; the difference being bringing about a specific end 
state. The continuity comes by means of the activities (represented by transitive verbs or 
participial expressions), which show how the entities involved act in their manner of 
production or by what action they connect to the subsequent stage.  
 The mechanism by which vinegar is made from wine is that a group of bacteria 
(called “Acetobacter”) converts the ethyl alcohol portion of the wine to acid. This is the 
acetic, or acid fermentation, that produces vinegar. Bacteria converting alcohol involves 
two entities and a connecting activity.  The end state is the vinegar.  There are more 
detailed ways of specifying the mechanism, for example: 
2 CH3CH2OH + 2 O2 --- > 2 CH3COOH + 2 H2O  
 Alcohol + Oxygen ----> Acetic Acid + Water 
In these two schemata the arrows represent the activity of production or conversion. 
 The continuity in the mechanism, as a whole or among the parts, is represented in 
our descriptions of the mechanism by a kind of semantic connection that shows how 
nouns (usually) are connected by verbs, where the connection is causal. Presumably this 
is what Hanson (1958) was talking about when he drew attention to the semantics of 
‘puncture wound’.  (In a couple of papers William Ruddick (1968) tried to elaborate this 
kind of ‘semantic’ connection.) 
 Some recent linguistic work, has noticed this continuity producing function of the 
ways verbs work.  Verbs, from my point of view, can be taken as linguistic 
representations of activities. Some cognitive grammar people represent them as event 
schemata. So for example, W. L Chafe (1970) argues  
The nature of the verb determines what nouns will accompany it, what the relation 
of these nouns to it will be and how these nouns will be semantically specified. 
For example if the verb is specified as an action, as in The men laughed, such a 
verb dictates that the noun to be related is agent which might be further specified 
as animate. (http://www.ilc.cnr.it/EAGLES96/rep2/node10.html) 
Or again, describing the changes in linguistics in the late 1980s and 1990s, the 
Encyclopedia of Linguistics speaks of the introduction of function words that divided 
sentence structure into functional domains.  The first of which is “a lexical domain 
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around the verb, which establishes semantic relations between the main sentence 
elements.” (http://strazny.com/encyclopedia/sample-function-words.html; p. 2) 
 Transitive verbs connect subjects with predicate objects or events. When these 
subjects and objects refer respectively to prior and posterior stages in a mechanism, the 
verb describes the activity by which the one effects or produces the other, and so they are 
our way of expressing the intelligible connections between the stages. Verbs (activities) 
connect the referring nouns, and allow for a description of the produced stage that may 
serve as a prediction as to what will come from that stage (or backwards what occurred 
that allowed that stage).  Choice of a particular verb, from the explanatory toolbox, in 
general constrains the acceptable descriptions of the next stage.  In “The bacteria convert 
the alcohol”, the ‘convert’ describes the production process by which 2 CH3CH2OH in 
the presence of oxygen (+ 2 O2) turns into 2 CH3COOH in its next stage.  Bacterial 
conversion tells us what to expect from the open bottle of wine that we left out all night. 
We might say, in the spirit of contrastive explanation, that the activity(-ies) and the 
originating entity(-ies) select by constraining the range of possible outcomes. We would 
not expect, under normal circumstances, the formation of lactic acid formation, C3H6O3 
or tartaric C4H6O6. This seems to coincide with Woodward’s causal specificity as ruling 
out alternative outcomes. 
 This view of verb function contrasts an older view of D. Genter, (1978), who 
treats verbs as relational between nouns. She holds that since only nouns refer, verbs 
taken as relations must be abstract.  So she believes nouns are processed easier and earlier 
than verbs.  This is to treat verbs are logical relations, rather than as referring terms. 
Logical relations are the wrong way to look at verbs (and nouns). This verb function has 
been recognized and elaborated upon by Michael Tomasello ad Jean Mandler.  
 Intelligible connections, and their associated descriptions, are learned as specific 
kinds of causal connections, most often from particular prototypical cases or exemplars. 
This view of the centrality of activities fits G. E. M. Anscombe’s theory of causation, 
where there is no deep metaphysical truth to be had about the nature of causality, but only 
specific cases and kinds that are learned and so recognized as causal. 
  
5.  Continuity and information 
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There is another kind of unity, common in biology and neuroscience in which the flow of 
information is used to describe what a system does in a way that shows how the stages 
are connected. “Information” is used in such explanations to provide an overarching 
connection among the stages, thus providing a principle of continuity.  Information 
attribution provides an identity condition (same information) that unites the stages as 
having contents that causally function as stages working towards the same end or as 
being guided by their beginning stage. 
 Some cases of information are like the information conveyed by a cooking recipe 
in that they provide instructions that guide subsequent inferences or actions (See Stegman 
2005, pp. 435-6).  Another kind of information functions like evidence that directs us 
towards drawing a certain inference. This is a kind of information that Ruth Millikan 
(2003) speaks about.  She also talks about teleosemantic information which directs 
processes that satisfy a goal set by evolution. Yet another common use of information 
comes from communication theory, and is often called Shannon Weaver information, 
which is a mathematical relation between a sender and a receiver defined as a probability 
relation among discrete elements of a message.  I am not here interested in any of these. 
 Jim Bogen and I have been trying to characterize a different kind of information 
that we call ‘mechanistic information.’ This is what we believe is common in the 
biological and neuro-sciences. For example, an organism’s system triggers some bit of 
DNA to ‘make a protein’ that is somehow needed by the larger system. The structure of 
the DNA and the activity of unwinding produce a guide for the production of the next 
step.  The structure of the DNA is a constraint on what RNA can be produced. Farther 
down stream, these activities constrain the amino acids that can be gathered to form the 
polypeptide. DNA producing polypeptides is not the result of human intention like 
following a recipe or drawing an inference. Yet it almost seems as though we are 
attributing a sort of intentionality, or specific kind of productive causal role, to the DNA 
by virtue of its structure.  The DNA ‘code’ functions to direct the stages of the 
mechanism that puts together the specific sequence of amino acids. DNA makes the 
polypeptide as an end product, and this end is a goal state or privileged because the 
system needs it to go onto make the protein. The protein fulfills some need of the system.  
The organism needs to protein in order to, for example, maintain its metabolic 
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functioning.  In general the purposes information serves need not be, though sometimes it 
may be, a function of evolution by natural selection. They also may be end states that 
have been learned to be important (learned goals as Millikan says). But often the goal is 
only an end state that the system needs to be able to function and/or maintain itself, or a 
goal that we, theorists, have identified as interesting for us among the various ones that 
are produced by the system.  These are all sufficient end states for a teleological system  
  But this teleology is not semantic in that the stages cannot be described as having 
semantic content in any interesting sense.  They have by virtue of being a mechanism the 
same kind of continuity that all mechanisms have.  But there is more. The stages are 
simply parts of different kinds of productive causal mechanisms, and so information must 
be ‘cashed out’ in terms of the content of the states that direct or reflect the entities and 
activities of production. But this ascription of content has ‘reach”—it extends and unifies 
the claims made about the whole of the mechanisms and not just parts.  It unifies by 
ascribing a purpose (function) to the whole. 
 The ascription of information flow to a system is a description based on an 
interpretationist stance that a researcher takes toward the system. We describe some 
stages among those constituting the mechanism contain "information" or content that 
describes the relation between that stage and the initial stage or the end stage.  
Mechanistic information is information about and/or information for.  In some cases the 
information about the initial stage is information for or used by the penultimate stage to 
bring about an appropriate response to what the information is about.   So for example, if 
a leech is prodded by a sharp stimulus, it bends away from that stimulus (Churchland and 
Senjowski).  Or differently said, the leech exhibits an aversive reaction. We may say here 
that the leech system carries information about the stimulus (and about a state of the 
world) that causes it to produce an aversive behavior. 
Calling the response an aversive behavior connects it back to the initiating noxious or 
dangerous environmental event, the prodding. 
Note that the behavior caused by the workings of the mechanism is not the whole of 
which the mechanism is a part.  The relevant whole may be the organism or in the leech 
case the organism functioning in an environment. 
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 Information transmission is a way of exhibiting by means of system description 
the unity that obtains within a system or why is it identified as one system or isolating 
what is to be identified as important for the system. In all cases the information 
transmission is a process that connects upstream entities and activities to downstream 
results.  Generally when information as content is present we say the content descriptions 
shows how the mechanism serves a purpose, or performs a function, which is usually 
conceived as guiding the bringing about or producing, or contributing to the production 
of the result completed at the end state, and this guidance is identified as significant or 
important for the organism or larger containing system. So a cockroach floating in a drink 
provides information to an adult, but not to many children, for a response of disgust 
(http://www.apa.org/monitor/oct03/gross.html). This information is somehow carried 
through the anterior insula as s crucial part of the mechanism. But the end state here is a 
functional teleological purposive state of the adult human in a real world context.  
 With mechanisms without information we say the end state is produced by the 
earlier stages in the mechanisms, and this mechanism or system is unified or counted as 
one because of the productive activities that provide continuity among the stages.  But we 
would not count the end state as a goal state, since there is no sense in which the initial or 
subsequent stages are for the sake of the end. Of course, we may trivialize information for 
and about, and use these terms to describe any mechanism, but then this leaves 
mechanical information unexplained.   
 The end state becomes a goal state, when the end state is evaluated as being of 
sufficient importance for the organism, or sometimes for a subsystem of the organism, to 
warrant the claim that the mechanism works for this purpose.   This warrant may come 
from another theory, e.g. natural selection in evolution, metabolic or homeostatic needs 
of an organism, etc.  It may also come from a perspectival attribution of importance by 
the researcher, e.g. memory loss in Altzheimer's is a fact, but it is considered important 
because researchers want to find a cure or a way of retarding its onset. 
 
5. Conclusion 
We are now back almost where we started with productive causality. But there is no time 
to explore this aspect. 
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